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sustAinAble develoPment And the legAl 
PRotection of the enviRonment in euRoPe
by Luis A. Avilés*
Sustainable development has gained considerable attention from environmental and supranational organi-zations, including the United Nations and the European 
Union (“EU”), since the concept was first discussed in the mid 
1970s1 and then defined by the United Nations as “development 
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”2 Environ-
mentalists hoped for a shift in policy and lawmaking that would 
balance present and future needs by accounting for environmental 
externalities resulting from economic development.3 They also 
hoped that the concept of sustainable development would spawn 
legal rules and principles that would resolve legal disputes without 
sacrificing the interests of either the environment or development.4 
This hope has yet to materialize and environmentalists now think 
sustainable development has become a euphemism for naked 
development.5 This article traces the adoption of sustainable 
development principles by the United Nations in the 1992 Rio 
Declaration and by the European Community and the European 
Union. Specifically, the article analyzes the concept of sustain-
able development under the primary and secondary law along 
with its treatment in the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(“CJEU”). The review illustrates that sustainable development 
has become a general principle in the European legal order, 
incorporated into the field of environmental protection via a set 
of sub-principles. The European legislature and the CJEU could 
further strengthen these principles by striking a balance between 
economic development and environmental protection, the dual 
underpinnings of sustainable development.
susTaInable developmenT:  
From sToCkholm 1972 To rIo 1992
Sustainable development has eluded concrete definition 
since its inception. Nonetheless, its importance is evident from 
its inclusion by the United Nations in the Stockholm Declaration 
on the Human Environment and in the establishment of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development (“CED”).6 In 
1987, the CED issued a report entitled Our Common Future 
(also known as the “Brundtland Report”), recommending 
“sustainable development” as a perspective for addressing the 
relationship between economic development, the environment, 
and the divide between rich and poor countries.7 Under this 
definition,8 the report identified two key priorities in making 
sustainable development decisions: assuring the needs of the 
poor9 and protecting natural resources to ensure present and 
future growth of civilization and technology.10
The United Nations 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development clarified the two priorities of sustainable 
development. The Declaration proclaimed twenty-seven prin-
ciples in the hope of forming an “equitable global partnership” 
among international stakeholders.11 The first four principles are 
of particular importance in defining sustainable development:
 Principle 1: Human beings are at the centre of concerns for 
sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy and 
productive life in harmony with nature.12
 Principle 2: States have, in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations and the principles of international law, 
the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant 
to their own environmental and developmental policies, 
and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environ-
ment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.13
 Principle 3: The right to development must be fulfilled so as 
to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs 
of present and future generations.14
 Principle 4: In order to achieve sustainable development, 
environmental protection shall constitute an integral part 
of the development process and cannot be considered in 
isolation from it.15
In Principle 1, the word “entitled” could be understood as 
part of the State’s duty or positive obligation to protect the human 
right to health and life. Principle 2 articulates a “good neighbor 
policy,” recognizing the State’s sovereign right to exploit its 
natural resources, while also imposing a responsibility to ensure 
that this exploitation does not damage other States. Principle 3 
limits the State’s development right with an inter-generational 
equitable duty to balance current needs with the needs of future 
generations. Finally, Principle 4 integrates environmental 
protection and development into a single process, insinuating 
the necessity for environmental regulation at all steps — from 
planning to execution — in the development process.
The Community of Nations’ announcement of these princi-
ples led to immense debate16 among policy makers considering 
international cooperation, human rights, trade, economics,17 and 
urban and strategic planning.18 As a result, policy makers have 
been unsuccessful in adopting sustainable development prin-
ciples, even when balancing development and environmental 
*Luis A. Avilés is the Associate Dean, University of Puerto Rico Law School. 
Professor Avilés is the former Chairman of the Puerto Rico Electric Power 
Authority. He has a JD from the Harvard Law School and an LLM in European 
Law from Université Pantheon-Assas Paris II.
30 SuStainable Development law & policy
concerns appears logical.19 Translating ideology into practice is 
not an easy task.20
susTaInable developmenT: polICy goal,  
legal prInCIple, or legal rule?
Any modern discussion about the difference between legal 
rules and legal principles ought to consider the ideas of legal 
philosopher Ronald Dworkin. According to Dworkin, rules 
are “applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion”21 while principles 
have “the dimension of weight or importance.”22 Furthermore, 
a principle is “a standard to be observed, not because it will 
advance or secure an economic, political, or social situation, but 
because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other 
dimension of morality.”23 Judges use legal principles to justify 
their reasoning when deciding a case and these principles are 
always weighed against other principles.24 Policy, on the other 
hand is a “kind of standard that sets out the goals to be reached, 
generally an improvement in some economic, political, or social 
feature of the community.”25 While courts use legal principals to 
weigh their decisions, the development of policies is the realm 
of legislatures and government agencies. Unfortunately, legal 
observers frequently intermingle principles and policies, result-
ing in confusion of the two terms.
Discussion about the “vagueness” of sustainable development 
and its inability to produce tangible results has been attributed 
to: 1) failure to strike a concrete balance among principles 
and policies when applied to actual situations, and 2) the 
difficulty of deriving legal norms or legal rules that create duties 
or obligations subject to review by courts.26 Regarding the first 
observation, author J.B. Ruhl rejects the either-or dichotomy 
between developers (whom he calls “resourcists”) and envi-
ronmentalists arguing that a third variable, social equity must 
be included in the sustainable development decision process.27 
Social Equity, both in its geographic (local to global) and time 
(intra-generational and inter-generational) dimensions This third 
consideration is necessary to balance development with environ-
mental concerns.28 Hans Vedder, a frequent commentator on EU 
environmental law, notes that while “[e]nvironmental protection 
and sustainable development continue to occupy a prominent 
place in the objectives of the European Union . . . , [a]n issue that 
remains unresolved is the exact weight to be given to the various 
objectives where they are at odds with each other.”29
Regarding the second observation, some scholars theorize 
that the integration of sustainable development and the legal 
system may result in three types of legal roles.30 These roles are: 
1) a standard of behavior, 2) a guiding principle that decision-
makers must rely on when making decisions, and 3) a general 
framework under which to interpret a given law.31 Most of the 
legislation aimed at achieving sustainable development utilizes 
the second and third roles. The main issue with making sus-
tainable development a legal standard of behavior involves the 
difficulty of defining the parameters of legal behavior. As Ruhl 
observed, sustainable development is a balance of economic, 
environmental, and equity considerations.32 However, there 
is no widely accepted scientific model that can formulate a 
standardized equation from such a multiplicity of interconnected 
variables whose informational quality varies considerably.33
Another author, John Gillroy, notes that, although sus-
tainable development is recognized as a general principle of 
international law, it has little relevance in the resolution of 
international disputes.34 To resolve a legal dispute, a legal 
principal must be recognized and capable of generating rules.35 
However, the legal principal of sustainable development is not 
capable of generating rules because it remains a collection of 
competing sub-principals.36 According to Gillroy, instead, the 
legal principle of sustainable development is a meta-principle 
of law comprised of four substantive and four procedural 
sub-principles that are sometimes at odds with each other. The 
four substantive principles are: 1) prevention, 2) precaution, 
3) the right to equitable development, and 4) the right to use 
internal resources so as not to harm other states.37 Gillroy’s 
four procedural principles are: 1) integration of environment 
and development, 2) concern for future generations and their 
welfare, 3) a common but differentiated responsibility, and 4) 
the polluter-pays.38 Gillroy argues that the frequent conflict 
between and among the procedural and substantive principles 
inhibits the meta-principal of sustainable development from 
generating legal rules that courts may use to resolve legal 
disputes.39 This is because the principles themselves are 
fundamentally unclear as to which should bear greater weight 
on a conceptual or legal scale. For instance, if precaution 
against environmental harm and prevention of environmental 
degradation are of critical importance, do these principles then 
place legal limits on a State’s right to develop or use its internal 
resources? Or, if preservation for future generations is seen as 
the end goal of sustainable development, should there be any 
limitation on the polluter-pays principle or the idea that devel-
opment and environmental interests can ever be integrated? 
These questions simply highlight the ambiguity inherent in 
the current state of sustainable development’s definitional and 
legal evolution.
Given these ambiguous, and often conflicting, principles, 
is it fair to draw the same conclusion when the legal prin-
ciple of sustainable development is applied to the resolution of 
disputes in a supranational court such as the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (“ECJ”)? The next section of the article 
considers how the ECJ has articulated the elusive principle of 
sustainable development when resolving disputes under various 
EU treaties.
european unIon’s CommITmenT  
To susTaInable developmenT
The tumultuous evolution of environmental protection 
within the EU began in the 1970s with the European 
Commission’s (“Commission”) “First Communication on 
Environmental Policy.”40 In this policy report, the issue of 
whether environmental problems should be addressed at the 
State or community level was put forward with Member States 
eventually agreeing to adopt community legislative measures.41 
Just a year after the 1987 release of the Brundtland Report, the 
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European Council began to shift its focus from environmental 
protection alone by considering additional issues related to 
sustainable development.42 However, almost a decade passed 
before the European Community incorporated sustainable devel-
opment into law when the Treaty of Amsterdam promulgated 
the concept as an objective43 by including the principle of a 
“balanced and sustainable development.”44 However, the Treaty 
of Amsterdam referred to sustainable development as a “general 
principle” but did not provide a definition of the concept.45 
Despite the lack of definition, a principle of environmental 
protection emerged because of the Treaty’s focus on careful 
usage of natural resources.46 The purpose was to balance the 
economic and environmental interests of present and future 
generations.47 Additionally, the European Community incorpo-
rated a “high level of protection and improvement of the quality 
of the environment” as an objective of the Treaty.48
Pursuing the theme of sustainable development under the 
1992 Rio Agenda, EU institutions commenced an aggressive 
legislative program49 based on the Fifth Environmental Program 
in 1998, which aimed to “review []the European Community 
programme of policy and action in relation to the environment 
and sustainable development ‘towards sustainability.’”50 Despite 
high hopes for this program, the European Commission reported 
that little progress had been achieved since 1992.51 However, the 
review found that the EU did change its focus on development 
from “environmental protection” to “environmental sustain-
ability” by shifting its attention from the negative environmental 
impacts of using natural resources to long-range planning for 
sustainable use of natural resources.52
Following this trend, the Commission unveiled its Sixth 
Environmental Action Program (“6EAP”) a few months 
before issuing the EU Rio+10 report, emphasizing the concept 
of “environmental sustainability” rather than “sustainable devel-
opment.”53 The 6EAP encouraged the use of the “integration 
principle” proposed in Article 11 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU)54 to incorporate the EU’s envi-
ronmental goals into the secondary legislation.55 The 6EAP 
also emphasized transparency in its encouraging the public to 
participate in decisions effecting the environment and promoting 
access to environmental information.56 However, a recent report 
from the European Institute for Environmental Policy draws less 
than optimistic conclusions on the achievements and future of 
the 6EAP, indicating that political forces at the Member State 
level may be to blame for the lack of paradigmatic changes 
to the legal protection of the environment since the Rio+10 
report.57 Most problematic is the delay in implementation of the 
“Thematic Strategies” that target environmental goals related to 
air, marine life, waste management, urban development, natural 
resources, pesticide usage, and soil.58
Currently, Article 3(3) of the Treaty on the European Union 
(“TEU”)59 mandates the establishment of an internal market 
based on the “sustainable development of Europe” based on three 
objectives: 1) balanced economic growth and price stability, 2) 
a highly competitive social market economy aimed at achiev-
ing full employment and social progress, and 3) “a high level 
of protection and improvement of the quality of the environ-
ment.”60 Thus, the historical objective of the EU — the creation 
of an internal market — must be accomplished incorporating 
sustainable development’s principles of balancing economic 
growth in a social market economy with a high level of envi-
ronmental protection. This goal marks a paradigm shift from the 
ordoliberal principles underlying the original Treaty of Rome.61 
Additionally, Article 3(3) defines sustainable development in the 
EU context by outlining the three objectives described above.62 
Article 3(3) echoes the Rio 1992 Declaration, emphasizing the 
conviction that a pursuit of a sustainable development strategy 
will work to eradicate world poverty and manage the world’s 
natural resources.63
However, sustainable development is not only the paradigm 
for the internal market. Article 3(5) of the TEU requires the 
EU to contribute to “the sustainable development of the Earth” 
through its international relationships.64 Additionally, Article 
21(2) of the TEU mandates EU States to “foster the sustainable 
economic, social, and environmental development of develop-
ing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty.”65 
Furthermore, sustainable development must be ensured using 
international cooperation to “preserve and improve the quality 
of the environment and the sustainable management of global 
natural resources.”66
Article 6(1) of the TEU incorporates into law a recognition 
of “the rights, freedoms and principles of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union . . . which shall have 
the same legal value as the Treaties.”67 Article 37 of the Charter 
provides that “[a] high level of environmental protection and the 
improvement of the quality of the environment must be inte-
grated into the policies of the Union and ensured in accordance 
with the principle of sustainable development.”68 This principle, 
now integrated into EU law, is similar to Gillroy’s sub-principle 
mandating a high level of environmental protection.69
The integration clause of Article 11 of the TEU provides 
a framework under which EU institutions may pursue compli-
ance with Gillroy’s procedural sub-principle of integration of 
the environment and development.70 This clause requires the 
integration of environmental protections into EU polices and 
activities to promote sustainable development.71 The Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union provides specific 
guidance on the environmental objectives of these policies and 
activities.72 Article 191(1) of the TFEU identifies the following 
objectives:
preserving, protecting and improving the quality of 
the environment, protecting human health, prudent 
and rational utilisation of natural resources, promoting  
measures at international [sic] level to deal with 
regional or worldwide environmental problems, and in 
particular combating climate change.73
Article 192(2) TFEU establishes that “a high level of 
[environmental] protection” will be achieved by “taking into 
account the diversity of situations in the various regions of 
the Union. It shall be based on the precautionary principle 
and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, 
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that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at 
source and that the polluter should pay.”74 Thus the “high level 
of protection and improvement of the quality of the environ-
ment” principle that defines the sustainable development of the 
EU’s internal market in accordance with Article 3(3) TEU, must 
incorporate the: precautionary principle,75 the source principle, 
the polluter pays principle, the prevention principle, and the 
safeguard clause. Any EU policy must integrate elements that 
correspond to the high level protection envisioned by the pro-
tection principle as shaped by its corresponding sub-principles. 
Otherwise, the policy and the secondary legislation that articu-
lates it, infringe the Treaties.
A host of secondary legislation issued as Directives 
to Members States has also incorporated the objective of 
sustainable development.76 One directive, the Water Framework 
Directive (“WFD”), incorporates the “river basin approach” to 
environmental water management and attempts to integrate a 
multi-sided sustainable development approach in its structure.77 
Commentators applaud such an approach to secondary legisla-
tion, while continuing to criticize the apparent lack of political 
will from Member States to speedily embrace such legislation.78
The European Union’s sustainable development mandate 
is not only limited to the European arena; it is also part of its 
international agenda.79 In addition to the EU efforts, individual 
Member States have attempted to incorporate sustainable devel-
opment into their domestic legal systems. The United Kingdom, 
for example, has incorporated the concept into urban planning.80
Sustainable development continues to elude environmental 
lawyers who operate in a command-and-control regulatory 
system that already affords effective legal protection to the 
victims of environmental harms.81 While sustainable development 
is part of the EU primary and secondary law, legal tribunals must 
still weigh the concept’s role when deciding disputes where the 
EU objectives of economic development, social development, 
and environmental protection clash. Thus, we must consider how 
the ECJ has articulated the legal principle of sustainable devel-
opment in the resolution of these disputes under the Treaties.
The eCJ and The prInCIple  
oF susTaInable developmenT
The ECJ has not shied from discussing sustainable develop-
ment principles in its decisions.82 Of all principles addressed in 
the ECJ, the principle of assuring a high level of environmental 
protection is the most integral to the implementation of sustain-
able development in the EU.83 The ECJ has even pronounced 
this principle in cases where the relevant treaties were quiet on 
the issue. In the Danish Bottles case,84 for example, the ECJ 
declared that the Member States may limit the free movement of 
goods under the Cassis de Dijon85 doctrine if it is necessary to 
protect the environment.86
Two recent cases also demonstrate the ECJ’s approach 
toward the interplay between the polluter pays principle, the 
prevention principle, and the precautionary principle. In the 
Grand Chamber decision of Raffinerie Meditarranee,87 the 
Court interpreted the polluter pays principle under Directive 
2004/35/EC, which outlined the environmental liability sur-
rounding the prevention and remedying of environmental dam-
age.88 There, the Italian court imposed penalties on the polluter 
parties that required remedial action beyond that established 
under the consultative process of the Directive.89 The remedial 
action was implemented “without that authority having carried 
out any assessment, before imposing those measures, of the 
costs and advantages of the changes contemplated from an eco-
nomic, environmental or health point of view.”90 In addition, the 
Court issued preventive orders to parties whose lands were not 
polluted or had been decontaminated before the effective date 
of the Directive.91 These measures afforded a higher level of 
environmental protection than the one required by the Directive, 
a stretch, but not prohibited by a literal reading of Article 193 of 
the TFEU.92 The Court further held that the polluter pays prin-
ciple could be incorporated into even more protective national 
measures:
Articles 7 and 11(4) of Directive 2004/35, in conjunction 
with Annex II to the directive, must be interpreted as 
permitting the competent authority to alter substantially 
measures for remedying environmental damage which 
were chosen at the conclusion of a procedure carried 
out on a consultative basis with the operators concerned 
and which have already been implemented or begun  
to be put into effect. However, in order to adopt such  
a decision, that authority:
– is required to give the operators on whom such 
measures are imposed the opportunity to be heard, 
except where the urgency of the environmental 
situation requires immediate action on the part of the 
competent authority;
– is also required to invite, inter alia, the persons 
on whose land those measures are to be carried out 
to submit their observations and to take them into 
account; and
– must take account of the criteria set out in Section 
1.3.1 of Annex II to Directive 2004/35 and state in 
its decision the grounds on which its choice is based, 
and, where appropriate, the grounds which justify the 
fact that there was no need for a detailed examination 
in the light of those criteria or that it was not possible 
to carry out such an examination due, for example,  
to the urgency of the environmental situation.93
Under this precedent, national authorities could impose 
a higher level of protection than originally devised under the 
Directive, provided they give the relevant parties the opportunity 
to be heard, invite the participation and comments of adjacent 
landowners, and the national measure is grounded in the need 
for urgent preventative action. The orders against the landown-
ers whose lands were not polluted also validates the measures 
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under the precautionary principle and the general principle of 
proportionality:
Directive 2004/35 does not preclude national legislation 
which permits the competent authority to make the 
exercise by operators at whom environmental recovery 
measures are directed of the right to use their land 
subject to the condition that they carry out the works 
required by the authority, even though that land is not 
affected by those measures because it has already been 
decontaminated or has never been polluted. However, 
such a measure must be justified by the objective of pre-
venting a deterioration of the environmental situation in 
the area in which those measures are implemented or, 
pursuant to the precautionary principle, by the objective 
of preventing the occurrence or resurgence of further 
environmental damage on the land belonging to the 
operators which is adjacent to the whole shoreline at 
which those remedial measures are directed.”94
In a second case decided the same year, Afton Chemical 
Limited,95 the ECJ affirmed the level of judicial review to be 
applied to institutional actions relying on complex environmental 
issues while further clarifying the role of the precautionary 
principle under European legislation. Afton, a chemical com-
pany was seeking to invalidate the limits imposed by Directive 
2009/30 to the additive MMT on grounds of the precautionary 
principle, pending a full assessment of its health and environmen-
tal impacts.96 Regarding judicial review, the ECJ affirmed that:
[I]n an area of evolving and complex technology . . . 
the European Union legislature has a broad discretion, 
in particular as to the assessment of highly complex 
scientific and technical facts in order to determine 
the nature and scope of the measures which it adopts, 
whereas review by the Community judicature has to be 
limited to verifying whether the exercise of such powers  
has been vitiated by a manifest error of appraisal or a 
misuse of powers, or whether the legislature has mani-
festly exceeded the limits of its discretion. In such a 
context, the Community judicature cannot substitute its 
assessment of scientific and technical facts for that of 
the legislature on which the Treaty has placed that task.
***
However, even though such judicial review is of limited 
scope, it requires that the Community institutions [that] 
have adopted the act in question must be able to show 
before the Court that in adopting the act they actually 
exercised their discretion, which presupposes the taking  
into consideration of all the relevant factors and circum-
stances of the situation the act was intended to regulate.97
Regarding the precautionary principle, the Court in Afton 
prescribed its application as follows:
A correct application of the precautionary principle 
presupposes, first, identification of the potentially nega-
tive consequences for health of the proposed use of 
[Methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl 
(“MMT”)] and, secondly, a comprehensive assessment 
of the risk to health based on the most reliable scientific 
data available and the most recent results of international 
research . . . [w]here it proves to be impossible to deter-
mine with certainty the existence or extent of the alleged 
risk because of the insufficiency, inconclusiveness or 
imprecision of the results of studies conducted, but the 
likelihood of real harm to public health persists should 
the risk materialise, the precautionary principle justifies  
the adoption of restrictive measures, provided they are 
non-discriminatory and objective (see Commission 
v France, paragraph 93 and case-law there cited) In 
those circumstances, it must be acknowledged that the 
European Union legislature may, under the precautionary  
principle, take protective measures without having to 
wait for the reality and the seriousness of those risks to 
be fully demonstrated.98
Ultimately, the Court held that the temporary restrictions 
on MMT additives in combustion fuels, pending a full scientific 
assessment, was objective and non-discriminatory and, there-
fore, a proper use of the precautionary principle.99
ConClusIon
The acquis communitaire demonstrates that the principle 
of sustainable development occupies a privileged position in 
the European legal order. The principle is a foundation of the 
EU Treaty, encompassing sub-principles — the precautionary 
principle, the source principle, the polluter pays principle, and 
the prevention principle — and promoting a balanced growth 
imperative via the safeguard clause of Article 192 TFEU.100 
European institutions have incorporated these principles in the 
secondary legislation of the EU and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union has commenced the long process of embroider-
ing these principles into the legal fabric of the EU.
Even though the Court of Justice has embraced adjudicat-
ing European law on the principles of environmental protection, 
articulation of these principles as sub-tenants of sustainable 
development remains absent. The European legislature ought 
to “put flesh to the bones” of the general environmental protec-
tion principles by noting that integration of these principles in 
a particular act or legislation satisfies the Treaties’ objective 
sustainable development.101 The principle of sustainable devel-
opment should also see the Court of Justice continue to apply 
environmental sub-principles. In doing so, the Court of Justice 
needs to provide a coherent interpretation of these principles to 
clearly establish the balancing between economic development 
and environmental protection that sustainable development 
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calls for. This consistent application will ensure that sustain-
able development as a legal principle will continue playing a key 
role in the development of European environmental law and will 
perhaps inspire other legal systems to follow suit.102 As the legal 
community takes up this trend, it will guide the evolution of the 
European Union in its quest to create “an ever closer union among 
the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as 
possible and as closely as possible to the citizen.”103
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